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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examined the impact of financial leverage on investment decisions of 
firms using the panel data of publicly traded Chinese firms. We collected data for 
511 manufacturing companies during the period from 2005 to 2013 to do the 
research. The data shows that financial leverage is negatively correlated with a 
firm’s investment. Moreover, after we categorized the data into two types: 1) 
high-growth firms and 2) low-growth firms, it demonstrated that such negative 
correlation is significant for low-growth firms while insignificant for high-growth 
firms. Additionally, long-term debt has a more significant negative correlation to 
investment than short-term debt. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Financial leverage and its impact on a firm’s investment decisions is a central topic 
for corporate finance. Although Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue that we should 
not “waste our limited worrying capacity on second-order and largely 
self-correcting problems like financing effect”; this paper will discuss how financial 
leverage affects firm value in real incomplete markets. In real incomplete markets, 
the agency problem may initiate the potential conflict between large shareholders 
and managers of the company. Such conflict will lead to over-investment activities 
by management without considering the effect on the value of the firm. The 
existence of financial leverage can relieve this conflict by forcing managers to give 
up their aggressive expansion strategies. Furthermore, Jenson (1986) argues the use 
of debt has a disciplining effect on management’s investment decisions. The 
conflict between large shareholders and creditors will lead to under-investment. 
Myers (1977) and Stulz (1990) prove that a decrease in financial leverage can 
reduce the agency cost from the conflict between large shareholders and 
bondholders. 
 
Previous studies have focused on data prior to the financial crisis. McConnell and 
Servaes (1995) and Lang et al. (1996) examined financial data for publicly traded 
firms in the U.S. Aivazian et al. (2005) supported their previous results with a 
sample of Canadian companies. Wang and Mao (2008) did a similar test with a 
sample of Chinese companies. All of these authors found that financial leverage has 
a negative correlation with investment expenditures. However, when considering 
the growth rate of the company, these reports indicated opposite results for 
low-growth firms as opposed to high-growth firms. For US and Canada, low-growth 
firms have a more significant negative correlation between leverage and investment 
than high-growth firms. However, the opposite is true for Chinese companies. This 
paper extends the prior literature with a longer period of time and more observations. 
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Additionally, in order to compare the final result with that of developed countries, 
this paper adjusted the independent variables and the dependent variables.  
As compared with developed countries, the Chinese market has different market 
policies and a lower level of market maturity. For instance, most Chinese firms have 
limited financing resources and obtain loans solely from commercial banks. More 
importantly, publicly traded domestic firms in China have a similar debt structure 
that is different significantly with Canadian and US firms. On average, short-term 
debt occupied about 73% of the total debt for Chinese firms. Based on Myers’ 
(1977) asset substitution effect theory, managers’ investment decisions can be 
affected by changing the debt structure. Therefore, this paper also examines how the 
duration of debt affects the investment decisions of publicly traded firms. 
 
As for analysis methods, this paper used panel data methodology in order to 
consider the impact of unobservable individual characters among firms. Similar to 
Aivazian et al. (2005), this paper uses pooling regression, fixed-effects model, and 
random-effects model to test which model is better for the sample. In addition, to 
avoid the industry differences and reduce the impact of operating stability, this 
paper selected data from manufacturing firms with the most stable operations and 
management in the manufacturing sector. Manufacturing is the most representative 
industry in China as it contains more than half of the Chinese publicly traded 
companies. The result of the paper indicates that an overuse of short-term debt can 
reduce the agency cost. However, overuse a shot-term debt can inhibit investment 
opportunities for firms. It concludes that firms with high-growth rates have an 
insignificant negative correlation between debt and investment expenditure while 
low-growth firms have a significant negative correlation. Therefore, for firms with 
few investment opportunities, the proportion of short-term debt should be controlled 
to maintain a relatively low level. Additionally, Chinese commercial banks should 
adjust their loan structures to overweight in long-term loans to support firms with 
high investment opportunities. 
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The paper is structured as follows; section two provides a theoretical review of the 
correlation between financial leverage and capital investment. Section three 
describes the historical data and variables used in the linear regression models for 
the investment equation. Section four presents results from the linear regression 
model. Section five concludes the paper. 
 
2. Financial leverage and investment’s correlation 
2.1 Theory based on investment opportunities  
Several authors have analyzed the topic of correlation between financial leverage 
and investment from different perspectives. Each author’s paper is based on a 
different time period and different samples. They obtained different conclusions 
using various models. This paper assumes that general publicly traded companies’ 
governance theory is based on dispersed ownership. That is, agency problems exist 
between large shareholders and managers as well as between large shareholders and 
creditors. Stulz (1990) combined the analysis of Myers (1977) and Jensen (1986) by 
generating an empirical model. He concluded that debt can relieve over-investment 
activities; however, debt can potentially cause under-investment. According to 
Stulz’s (1990) hypothesis, when managers do not hold shares of their company, they 
have motivations to enlarge their company’s scales by investing in poor projects 
(ROE− 𝑘! < 0). Large shareholders can solve this problem by requiring managers 
to issue debt for financing, so that managers have to pay the interest and principal to 
bondholders in the near future. Such a strategy limits the free cash flow available 
for managers. However, if the leverage ratio is too high, the managers have to give 
up some good projects because of limited free cash flows. This problem occurs 
more frequently in high-growth companies than in low-growth companies. 
Moreover, a higher leverage ratio can reduce a project’s benefits to shareholders 
because a large proportion of the profit is needed to pay back the bondholders. 
Therefore, highly levered firms are less willing to bid for valuable projects as 
compared to low leveraged firms. McConnell and Servaes (1995) summarized such 
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phenomenon as the duality of financial leverage. They examined a large sample of 
non-financial United States firms for the years 1976, 1986 and 1988. After 
categorizing their data into two groups: 1) high-growth firms and 2) low-growth 
firms, they found that corporate value has a negative correlation to leverage in 
high-growth firms while a positive correlation to leverage in low-growth firms.  
 
The Chinese market fits for Stulz’s (1990) model since most of the managers have 
few or no company shares. Hence, we can estimate that managers have the same 
motivations to build up the enterprise in order to maximize their self-interest. 
Therefore, an increase in debt can restrict free cash flow regardless of the purpose 
of a company’s debt. Such a strategy has a positive effect in inhibiting 
over-investment. The duality of financial leverage also fits for Chinese firms as the 
agency cost problem still exist. Based on the above theory, the paper assumes that 
for firms with few investment opportunities, the positive effect in inhibiting a firms’ 
over-investment should exceed the negative effect on under-investment because 
financial leverage can prevent managers’ investment in negative NPV projects. 
Meanwhile, for firms with many investment opportunities, the negative effect of 
under-investment dominated because the financial leverage can force managers to 
be burdened by debt payment and thus give up positive NPV projects. 
 
2.2 Theory based on debt structure 
Myers (1977) points out companies can reduce the maturity of debt to influence 
managers’ investment decision. On one hand, issuing short-term debt can increase 
the pressure on liquidity so that managers have less free cash flow available for 
investment. On the other hand, the agency cost of debt for long-term debt is 
generally higher than for short-term debt. Therefore, the asset substitution effect is 
more likely to occur. Hence, reducing the debt maturity can control the asset 
substitution effect caused by managers. 
 
The Chinese market is less mature than the market of developed countries. Jiang 
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and Shen (2005) argue that Chinese publicly traded companies have significant 
over-investment and asset substitution effect. Commercial banks, as sole creditors 
for most Chinese domestic firms, prevent their potential losses from such potential 
risk by adjusting their loan structure. Generally, commercial banks issue more 
short-term debt and convert the long-term debt to multiple short-term debts. Hence, 
only firms with relatively strong positive investment opportunities can obtain 
long-term debt in China. This result indicates that the reduction of debt maturity can 
relieve the conflict between large shareholders and debt holders. Because the 
short-term debt creates much more pressure on free cash flow than long-term debt, 
firms with high investment opportunities must face the problem of under-investment 
due to the overuse of short-term debt. On the contrary, firms with low investment 
opportunities may get the opposite result based on different investment strategies. 
Unlike short-term debt, long-term debt will not initiate future investment because 
debt holders lend money to the firm if they fully discern the future performance and 
growth opportunities of the company. Several previous researches prove this 
conclusion. Lang et al. (1996) demonstrated that the negative correlation between 
growth opportunities and leverage only holds in the case when the real growth 
opportunity is not well estimated by the market. Zhengfei et al. discovered that net 
new long-term debt has a positive correlation with the net new investment. 
 
2.3 Linear regression methods 
Lang et al. (1996) has used a pooling regression to estimate a large sample of US 
industrial firms between 1970 and 1989. They found a negative correlation between 
leverage and investment. McConnell and Servaes (1995) also use pooling 
regressions to identify the impact of leverage on a firm’s growth. Aivazian et al. 
(2005) analyzed the impact of leverage on investment for 1035 major Canadian 
industrial companies existing at the end of 1999. Besides the pooling regression, 
they also used the fixed effects model and the random effects model to get their 
results. They concluded that there is a negative relationship between investment and 
leverage and this negative relationship is significantly stronger for low-growth firms 
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than for high-growth firms. Odit and Chittoo (2008) used data of Mauritian firms 
and obtained a similar result for the basic investment model, but obtained an 
insignificant value for high-growth firms. Wang and Mao (2008) also use three 
linear regression models but with samples of Chinese industrial firms. However, 
they concluded that high-growth firms have stronger negative correlation between 
leverage and investment compared to low-growth firms, which is contradictory to 
Aivazian et al.’s (2005) conclusion. 
 
3. Historical data and variables 
3.1 Data resources 
This paper analyzed data during 2005-2013 using the ORBIS database. We 
collected the data of 511 firms in the Chinese manufacturing industry. In order to 
control the industry effect, we choose manufacturing industry because over 50% of 
firms in China are categorized as manufacturing firms. Additionally, manufacturing 
firms are relatively stable, as evidenced by their annual reports, compared to firms 
in other industries. Moreover, manufacturing firms have a pattern of overweighting 
short-term debt. We originally collected data for 2,312 firms. Since the model has a 
one-year lag, we collected data starting from 2004. Three types of firms were 
removed from our data: 1) firms with empty data and missing variables, 2) firms 
with abnormal financial statements, and 3) firms with Tobin’s Q outlier, that is, 
value removed outside the range of average Tobin’s Q±2𝜎 . Eventually, we 
obtained an unbalanced panel of 3,635 observations of 511 firms during a 10-year 
period. All results were obtained using Excel 2010 and STATA 12.1 analysis. 
 
3.2 Variables 
The dependent variable in our regression is the net investment ratio. It is measured 
by book value of net capital expenditure divided by lagged net fixed assets. 
We generated four independent variables in our model. The leverage is calculated 
similar to Aivazian et al.’s (2005) method. We divided book value of total debt by 
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book value of total assets to measure the leverage in the first model. Additionally, 
we also divided short-term debt by total assets and divided long-term debt by total 
assets to measure the difference between long-term debt and short-term debt. The 
Tobin’s Q is measured as the market value of total assets divided by the book value 
of total assets. The market value of the firm is the sum of book value of total 
liabilities, the market value of common shares and the estimated value of preferred 
shares. We noticed that preferred shares do not exist in the Chinese stock market. 
This allowed us to use 0 for the estimated value of preferred shares. Sale is 
measured as net sales divided by lagged net fixed assets. The cash flow is measured 
as the sum of earnings before investment and tax and depreciation. 
 
Table 1 
Summary statistics for leverage, investment, and growth opportunities 
  
Mean 
25th  
Median 
75th  Standard  
percentile percentile deviation 
Investment 0.093 -0.009 0.048 0.145 0.213 
Cash Flow 0.100 0.053 0.085 0.129 0.087 
Leverage 0.597 0.486 0.607 0.713 0.170 
Long-term debt 0.108 0.020 0.070 0.160 0.117 
Short-term debt 0.435 0.313 0.428 0.547 0.172 
Sale 1.937 0.736 1.299 2.341 2.423 
Tobin's Q 1.402 0.988 1.245 1.644 0.670 
The sample consists of all Chinese manufacturing firms listed in ORBIS. The data file covers  
the period from 2005 – 2013 with an unbalanced panel of 3,635 observations of 511 firms. 
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. There is a 
high variation of investment among the manufacturing firms in China. The mean of 
the ratio of net investment to net fixed assets (Investment) is 0.093, while the 
standard deviation is 0.213 which is nearly 2.3 times the mean. The sample average 
Tobin’s Q (Tobin’s Q) of 1.402 indicates the expectations of growth opportunities 
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for manufacturing firms over this sample period. The mean of the ratio of total debt 
to total assets (Leverage) is 0.597, indicating that the liability is slightly higher than 
the shareholder’s equity. The short-term debt is 73% of total debt. This 
demonstrates that Chinese firms have a significant reliance on short-term debt 
financing. 
 
4. Leverage and investment 
4.1 Model specification: 
We assume that the investment strategy of the company is already decided at the 
beginning of each year and that it has a linear relationship with the debt-to-assets 
ratio. This specification is similar to that of Aivazian et al. (2005) which considers 
the following panel data generating process: 
 
 𝐼!,! = 𝛼 + 𝜆! + 𝜂𝐿!,!!! + 𝛽𝐶𝐹!,! + 𝜑𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒!,!!! + 𝛿𝑄!,!!! + 𝜇! + 𝜀!,!        (1) 
 
Where 𝐼!,! is the ratio of the net investment of firm i at time t to the lagged net 
fixed assets; 𝐿!,!!! is lagged leverage; 𝐶𝐹!,!  is cash flow of firm i at time t; 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒!,!!! is lagged net sales of firm i; 𝑄!,!!! is lagged Tobin’s Q; 𝛼 is unknown 
intercept for each firm; 𝜆! is a set of time dummy variables which control the time 
effects whenever unexpected variations or special events occur in the year; 𝜇! is 
the individual effect of firm i, and 𝜀!,! is the error term. 
 
Table 2 shows the regression results of empirical models. We used three different 
methodologies, namely, 1) pooling regression, 2) fixed effects model and 3) random 
effects model. The results show that leverage has a negative impact on investment. 
The estimates range from -0.2143 to -0.0475. This indicates the investment to 
capital ratio decreases by about 0.0475 to 0.2143 when the leverage increases by 1 
unit. Cash flows and lagged net sales are shown to be positively significant related 
to investment. Tobin’s Q, which measures a firm’s growth opportunities, has a 
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significant positive effect on investment. 
 
Table 2: Regression Analysis: Net Investment 
  Leverage   =    (Total  debt/Total  Assets)!!! 
  
Pooling Fixed Effect Random Effect 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept   0.0589***   
0.000 
 0.1300***   
0.000 
0.0842***  
0.000 
  3.695  5.386 4.554 
Leverage  -0.0475*  
0.023 
 -0.2143***  
0.000 
 -0.1040***   
0.000 
  -2.271 -5.938 -4.121 
Cash Flow  0.2624***   
0.000 
 0.2264***   
0.000 
 0.2400*** 
0.000 
  6.506 4.866 5.716 
Sale  0.0097***   
0.000 
 0.0194***   
0.000 
 0.0133***   
0.000 
  6.681 8.586 7.826 
Tobin’s Q  0.0126*    
0.016 
  0.0220***   
0.001 
 0.0166** 
0.003 
  2.410 3.430 2.952 
Adj. R-squared 0.0258 0.1705   
LM test Chi2(1) = 119.59*** 
  
Hausman test Chi2(4) = 41.72*** 
 
 
  
Individual effect  F(510, 3120) = 2.24         
This table provides the regression results of the impact of leverage on investment for Chinese 
publicly traded manufacturing firms using three different methodologies (pooling regression, 
fixed effects model, and random effects model). t-statistics are provided below the coefficient 
estimates. The Lagrangian Multiplier (LM test) is used to test the random effects regression 
versus the pooling regression. The Hausman test is used to test the fixed effects model versus 
the random effects model. 
 * Significant at the 5% level 
 ** Significant at the 1% level 
 *** Significant at the 0.1% level 
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Three statistical tests are used in order to identify the most appropriate methodology 
in this study. Firstly, to compare the pooled estimate and random effects estimate, 
the Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) Test (Breusch and Pagan, 1980) is performed. The 
null hypothesis is that the individual effect (𝜇!) is 0. With a large chi-square, which 
is equal to 119.59, we reject the null at 0.1% significance level. This suggests that 
the individual effect is not zero and that the pooling regression is not suitable in this 
case. Secondly, to compare the random effects estimates with the fixed effects 
estimates, we conducted the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978). If the model is 
correctly specified and there is no correlation between individual effects (𝜇!) and 
independent variables (𝑋), the fixed effects and random effects model should get 
the same result. A high chi-square 41.72 rejects the null hypothesis Corr   𝜇! ,𝑋 =0 at 0.1% significance level. Moreover, the fixed effects model provides F test to 
reject null hypothesis  𝜇! = 0. The results suggest that the fixed effects model is 
most appropriate in estimating the determinants of investment decisions. The 
coefficients estimated by the pooling regression are much smaller than the 
coefficients estimated by the fixed or random effects models. Thus suggesting that 
ignoring individual effects leads to under-estimating the impact of leverage on 
investment. 
 
We next consider the issues that might affect the estimation of the fixed effects 
model. Firstly, there might be high correlations among the independent variables. 
For example, the capacity of a firm to borrow money is determined by its cash flows. 
The greater the cash flows generated are as a percent of enterprise value, the higher 
the optimal debt ratio of a firm. Moreover, a high growth in sales may result from 
enlarging the company’s scales. In general, most of the firms issue debt to expand 
the company’s scale. Thus, there might be a correlation between sales and debt. The 
high correlation among the independent variables may affect the efficiency of the 
estimates. The correlations among the independent variables are reported in Table 3 
and most of them are generally less than 0.300. Thus, collinearity is not a serious 
problem. 
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Table 3: Correlation among independent variables 
  Investment Leverage 
Long-term 
debt 
Short-term 
debt 
Cash 
Flow 
Sale 
Tobin's 
Q 
Investment 1.000 
      
Leverage -0.038 1.000 
     
Long-term debt 0.046 0.333 1.000 
    
Short-term debt -0.070 0.704 -0.373 1.000 
   
Cash Flow 0.112 -0.116 0.025 -0.138 1.000 
  
Sale 0.101 0.144 -0.260 0.343 -0.042 1.000 
 
Tobin's Q 0.055 -0.082 -0.148 0.020 0.113 0.001 1.000 
 * Significant at the 5% level 
 
4.2 Growth opportunities, leverage and investment 
Aivazian et al. (2005) found out that the negative correlation between financial 
leverage and investment expenditure is significantly stronger in low-growth firms 
than in high-growth firms. Wang and Mao (2008) argue that financial leverage will 
cause under-investment for companies with high-growth opportunities while initiate 
over-investment for low-growth companies.  
To test the differences in the role of leverage for high-growth versus low-growth 
firms we use the following specification: 
 𝐼!,! = 𝛼 + 𝜆! + 𝜂𝐿!,!!! + 𝛾𝐷×𝐿!,!!! + 𝛽𝐶𝐹!,! + 𝜑𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒!,!!! + 𝛿𝑄!,!!! + 𝜇! + 𝜀!,!  (2) 
 
Where D is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if Tobin’s Q>1, and 0 otherwise. 
Table 4 indicates that low-growth companies have a significant negative correlation 
between leverage and investment. However, we cannot conclude that high-growth 
companies have the same results since we obtained insignificant values for all of the 
three models. Nevertheless, all of the three models show a negative coefficient that 
indicates correlation sign of the regression will not be changed by how we define 
high-growth or low-growth firms. Only the significance level is affected by such 
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classification. One of the explanations of this result is that high-growth companies 
can easily obtain funds from capital markets and thus do not depend solely on debt 
provided by commercial banks. 
 
Table 4: Regression analysis: growth opportunity, investment, and leverage 
  Leverage   =    (Total  debt/Total  Assets)!!! 
  
Pooling Fixed Effect Random Effect 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 0.0572***  
0.001 
0.1271***   
0.000 
0.0817***  
0.000 
  3.414 5.154 4.272 
Leverage   -0.0432* 
0.079 
 -0.2046***   
0.000 
 -0.0967***   
0.001 
  -1.755 -5.155 -3.356 
D×Leverage -0.0049 
0.741 
-0.0105 
0.557 
-0.0081 
0.605 
  -0.330 -0.588 -0.518 
Cash Flow 0.2620***   
0.000 
0.2284***  
0.000 
 0.2404***  
0.000 
  6.491 4.895 5.725 
Sale 0.0097***   
0.000 
 0.0194***   
0.000 
 0.0133***   
0.000 
  6.687 8.583 7.828 
Tobin’s Q 0.0136**  
0.023 
0.0232***   
0.001 
0.0178***  
0.004 
  2.277 3.452 2.915 
Adj. R squared 0.0255 0.1703   
LM test Chi2(1) = 119.70*** 
  
Hausman test Chi2(5) = 43.60*** 
  
  
individual effect  F(510, 3119) = 2.24          
This table provides empirical results of the effects of leverage on the investment of firms with 
high-growth opportunities and low-growth opportunities. t-statistics are below the coefficients. 
D is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if Tobin’s Q is larger than 1 and 0 otherwise. 
* Significant at the 10% level 
 ** Significant at the 5% level 
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 *** Significant at the 1% level 
 
4.3 Debt structure, leverage and investment 
To test how debt structure affects the investment decisions, we put both the 
short-term debt and long-term debt into the model. Such a model examines the 
difference between short-term and long-term debt. The model is as follows: 
 𝐼!,! = 𝛼 + 𝜆! + 𝜂𝑆𝐷!,!!! + 𝛾𝐿𝐷!,!!! + 𝛽𝐶𝐹!,! + 𝜑𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒!,!!! + 𝛿𝑄!,!!! + 𝜇! + 𝜀!,! (3) 𝐼!,! = 𝛼 + 𝜆! + 𝜂𝑆𝐷!,!!! + 𝛾𝐿𝐷!,!!! + 𝜃𝐷×𝑆𝐷!,!!! + 𝜏𝐷×𝐿𝐷!,!!! + 𝛽𝐶𝐹!,! +                          𝜑𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒!,!!! + 𝛿𝑄!,!!! + 𝜇! + 𝜀!,!                                  (4) 
 
where 𝑆𝐷!,!!! is lagged short-term debt ratio and 𝐿𝐷!,!!! is lagged long-term debt 
ratio. D is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if Tobin’s Q>1, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Table 5 listed the pooling regression, fixed effects model, and the random effects 
model results. We found that the fixed effects model fits the sample best since the 
short-term debt and long-term debt are more significant in the fixed effects model 
compared to the pooling and random effects models. From this result, we found that 
when we put both variables into the model, the negative correlation on short-term 
debt (-0.2240, significant at 0.1% level) is smaller than long-term debt (-0.2721, 
significant at 0.1% level). This result indicates that short-term debt has a relatively 
smaller effect on investment expenditures as compared to long-term debt. It 
supports the theory that decreasing the debt maturity helps mitigate the 
contradiction associated with different interests of shareholders and debt-holders. 
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Table 5: Regression analysis: debt structure and investment 
  
Pooling Fixed Effect Random Effect 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 0.0551***   
0.000 
0.1298***   
0.000 
0.0816***   
0.000 
  3.664 5.800 4.714 
Short-term debt  -0.10756***  
0.000 
 -0.2240***   
0.000 
 -0.1495***  
0.000 
  -4.719 -5.79 -5.531 
Long-term debt 0.1045**   
0.001 
 -0.2721***   
0.000 
0.0034 
0.931 
  3.208 -4.924 0.086 
Cash Flow 0.2407***   
0.000 
0.2246***   
0.000 
0.2350***   
0.000 
  5.977 4.821 5.615 
Sale  0.0131***   
0.000 
0.0194***   
0.000 
0.0150***  
0.000 
  8.522 8.543 8.608 
Tobin’s Q 0.0172**   
0.001 
 0.0218*** 
0.001 
0.0183**   
0.001 
  3.264 3.392 3.262 
Adj. R squared 0.0365 0.1725   
LM test Chi2(1) = 94.79*** 
  
Hausman test Chi2(5) = 58.47*** 
  
  
individual effect  F(510, 3119) =  2.17         
Table 5 provides the empirical results of the effects of two alternative leverage types on  
firm investment: short-term debt and long-term debt. t-statistics are below the coefficients. 
* Significant at the 5% level 
 ** Significant at the 1% level 
 *** Significant at the 0.1% level 
 
Table 6 listed the pooling regression, fixed effects model, and the random effects 
model results by classified companies as different growth opportunities. The result 
indicates that short-term debt and long-term debt has negative correlations to 
investment for low-growth companies. Moreover, long-term debt has a stronger 
negative correlation (-0.3025, significant at 0.1% level) than short-term debt 
(-0.2008, significant at 0.1% level) for low-growth firms, which is consistent with 
our results in Table 5. However, the results show that there is an insignificant 
negative correlation between debts to investment for high-growth companies since 
both of the dummy variables demonstrate an insignificant coefficient value. This 
means high-growth firms do not obey the theory that debt plays a discipline role for 
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investment decisions. One reason for this result is that high-growth companies may 
have several financing sources besides debt so that debt may contribute little for 
their investment. Thus, short-term and long-term debt will not affect their 
investment decisions. 
 
Table 6: Regression analysis: debt structure, growth opportunity and investment 
 
Table 6 provides the empirical results of the effects of two alternative leverage types (short-term 
debt and long-term debt) on the investment of firms with high-growth opportunities and 
low-growth opportunities. t-statistics are below the coefficients. D is a dummy variable which is 
equal to 1 if Tobin’s Q is larger than 1 and 0 otherwise. 
* Significant at the 5% level 
 ** Significant at the 1% level 
 *** Significant at the 0.1% level 
 
 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept 0.0561***  0.1260***  0.0799***  
3.505 5.487 4.426
Short-term debt  -0.1064***  -0.2008***   -0.1378*** 
-3.475 -4.372 -3.991
Long-term debt 0.0850  -0.3025***  -0.0194
1.710 -4.105 -0.340
D*Short-term debt -0.0019 -0.2602 -0.0134
-0.081 -0.946 -0.554
D*Long-term debt 0.0283 0.4645 0.0343
0.511 0.687 0.576
Cash Flow 0.2414***  0.2273***  0.2357***  
5.99 4.863 5.629
Sale  0.0131***  0.0194***  0.0150*** 
8.520 8.545 8.606
Tobin's Q 0.0165**   0.0230*** 0.0189**  
2.765 3.422 3.093
Adj. R squared
LM test
Hausman test
individual effect
0.935
0.609
0.344
0.492
0.580
0.565
Chi2(1) = 94.71***
Chi2(5) = 62.62***
 F(510, 3117) =  2.17
0.006 0.001 0.002
0.0360 0.1723
0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000
0.001 0.000 0.000
0.087 0.000 0.734
Pooling Fixed Effect Random Effect
0.000 0.000 0.000
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5. Conclusion 
This paper extended previous empirical studies on the relationship between leverage 
and investment in several aspects. It examined 511 Chinese publicly traded 
manufacturing firms during the period 2005-2013. Using panel data and statistical 
analysis we concluded that leverage has a significantly negative effect on 
investment. This corresponds with most recent studies. We categorized our sample 
into two parts: 1) high-growth firms and 2) low-growth firms. Although the results 
demonstrated that the negative correlation between leverage and firm investment 
holds for low-growth firms, this is not the case for high-growth firms. The results 
suggested that leverage has an insignificantly negative impact on investment for 
high-growth firms. This result conflicted with Aivazian et al. (2005) and Wang and 
Mao (2008), but is consistent with Odit and Chittoo (2008). Additionally, we also 
examined how debt structure affects the firm investment. We concluded that 
long-term debt has a stronger negative effect on investment as compared to 
short-term debt. However, this results only significant for low-growth firms. 
Moreover, overuse of short-term debt can reduce the asset substitution effect. On 
the other hand, overuse of short-term debt inhibits the investment opportunities. Our 
results support the theory of duality of leverage mentioned by Jensen (1986), Myers 
(1977), Stulz (1990) and MeConnel and Servaes (1995), especially for firms with 
weak growth opportunities. 
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Appendix Variable definitions 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝐼) = 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 − 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑  𝑁𝑒𝑡  𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑  𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐿 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚  𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑆𝐷 = 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚  𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 − 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚  𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜   𝐿𝐷 = 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔  𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚  𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ  𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤   𝐶𝐹 = 𝑁𝐼 + 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡  𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 + 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑  𝑁𝑒𝑡  𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑  𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒 =    𝑁𝑒𝑡  𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑  𝑁𝑒𝑡  𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑  𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛!𝑠𝑄   𝑄 =   𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡  𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 +𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡  𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘  𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  
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